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PREVENTING BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACKS WITH
RELIABLE AND LOW COST SYSTEM
1

B V S NAGARAJU, 2Y. SRINIVASA RAO & 3P. HARINI

St.Anns College of Engineering & Technology, Chirala, AP, India
Email: nag8888@gmail.com, tysr_cse@yahoo.co.in, hpogadadanda@yahoo.co.in
Abstract: Detection of Data Flow Anomalies There are static or dynamic methods to detect data flow anomalies in the
software reliability and testing field. Static methods are not suitable in our case due to its slow speed; dynamic methods are
not suitable either due to the need for real execution of a program with some inputs. Their scheme is rule-based, whereas
SigFree is a generic approach which does not require any pre-known patterns. Then, it uses the found patterns and a data
flow analysis technique called program slicing to analyze the packet’s payload to see if the packet really contains code Four
rules (or cases) are discussed in this work.
Keywords: Signature free, SigFree, Buffer Overflow, Worm, Security.

CLET , and worm Slammer, CodeRed and a
CodeRed variation, when they are well mixed with
various types of data packets. Also, our experiment
results show that the throughput degradation caused
by SigFree is negligible.

1. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the observation that buffer
overflow attacks typically contain executables
whereas legitimate client requests never contain
executables in most Internet services, SigFree blocks
attacks by detecting the presence of code. SigFree
first blindly dissembles and extracts instruction
sequences from a request. It then applies a novel
technique called code abstraction, which uses data
flow anomaly to prune useless instructions in an
instruction sequence. Finally it compares the number
of useful instructions to a threshold to determine if
this instruction sequence contains code. SigFree is
signature free, thus it can block new and unknown
buffer overflow attacks; SigFree is also immunized
from most attack-side code obfuscation methods.
Since SigFree is transparent to the servers being
protected, it is good for economical Internet wide
deployment with very low deployment and
maintenance cost. We implemented and tested
SigFree; our experimental study showed that SigFree
could block all types of code injection attack packets
(above 250) tested in our experiments. Moreover,
SigFree causes negligible throughput degradation to
normal client requests.
We proposed SigFree, a real-time, signature free,
out of- the-box blocker that can filter code-injection
buffer overflow attack messages, one of the most
serious cyber security threats, to various Internet
services. SigFree does not require any signatures,
thus it can block new, unknown attacks
We have implemented a SigFree prototype as a proxy
to protect web servers. Our empirical study shows
that there exists clean-cut “boundaries” between code
embedded payloads and data payloads when our code
data separation criteria are applied. We have
identified the “boundaries” (or thresholds) and been
able to detect/ block all 50 attack packets generated
by Metasploit framework , all 200 polymorphic
shellcode packets generated by two well-known
polymorphic shellcode engine ADMmutate and

Figure 1 SigFree Application Layer

2. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
1. Prevention/Detection of Buffer Overflows:
Throughout the history of cyber security, buffer
overflow is one of the most serious vulnerabilities in
computer systems. Buffer overflow vulnerability is a
root cause for most of the cyber attacks such as server
breaking-in, worms, zombies, and botnets. Buffer
overflow attacks are the most popular choice in these
attacks, as they provide substantial control over a
victim.
Class 1A: Finding bugs in source code. Buffer
overflows are fundamentally due to programming
bugs. Accordingly, various bug-finding tools have
been developed. The bug-finding techniques used in
these tools, which in general belong to static analysis,
include but not limited to model checking and bugsasdeviant- behavior.
Class 1B: Compiler extensions. “If the source code is
available, a developer can add buffer overflow
detection automatically to a program by using a
modified compiler.”
Class 1C: OS modifications. Modifying some
aspects of the operating system may prevent
buffer overflows such as Pax , LibSafe and eNeXsh .
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Class 1C techniques need to modify the OS.
In contrast, SigFree does not need any
modification of the OS.
Class 1D: Hardware modifications. A main idea
of hardware modification is to store all return
addresses on the processor [4]. In this way, no
input can change any return address.
Class 1E: Defense-side obfuscation. Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a main
component of PaX . Bhatkar and Sekar proposed
a comprehensive address space randomization
scheme. Addressspace randomization, in its
general form , can detect exploitation of all
memory errors.
Class 1F: Capturing code running symptoms of
buffer overflow attacks. Fundamentally, buffer
overflows area code running symptom. If such
unique symptoms can be precisely captured, all
buffer overflows can be detected.

exploited this very problem). The position of a
malicious payload is determined by the exploited
vulnerability. A malicious payload may be embedded
in the Request-URI field as a query parameter.
However, as the maximum length of Request-URI is
limited, the size of a malicious payload, hence the
behavior of such a buffer overflow attack, is
constrained. It is more common that a buffer
overflow attack payload is embedded in RequestBody of a POST method request. Technically, a
malicious payload may also be embedded in RequestHeader, although this kind of attacks have not been
observed yet. In this work, we assume an attacker can
use any request method and embed the malicious
code in any field.
4. URI decoder.
The specification for URLs limits the allowed
characters in a Request-URI to only a subset of the
ASCII character set. This means that the query
parameters of a request-URI beyond this subset
should be encoded . Because a malicious payload
may be embedded in the request-URI as a request
parameter, the first step of SigFree is to decode the
request-URI.

2.Worm Detection and Signature Generation
The implementation of their approach is
resilient to a number of code transformation
techniques. Although their techniques also
handle binary code, they perform offline
analysis. In contrast, SigFree is an online attack
blocker. As such, their techniques and SigFree
are complementary to each other with different
purposes. Moreover, unlike
SigFree, their techniques
may not be
suitable to block the code contained in every
attack packet, because some buffer overflow
code is so simple that very little control flow
information can be exploited
3. SigFree Attack Model
An attacker exploits a buffer overflow
vulnerability of a web server by sending a crafted
request, which contains a malicious payload.
Figure 3 shows the format of a HTTP request.
There are several HTTP request methods among
which GET and POST are most often used by
attackers.

5. ASCII Filter:
Malicious executable code is normally binary
strings. In order to guarantee the throughput and
response time of the protected web system, if the
query parameters of the request-URI and requestbody of a request are both printable ASCII ranging
from 20-7E in hex, SigFree allows the request to pass
we will discuss a special type of executable codes
called alphanumeric shellcodes that actually use
printable ASCII) .

Figure 2 Instruction sequences distilled from a
Substring of a GIF file

Although HTTP 1.1 does not allow GET to have a
request body, some web servers such as Microsoft IIS
still dutifully read the request-body according to the
request-header’s instructions (the CodeRed worm
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web server that provides only limited Internet
services.
Our test based on the above real traces did not
yield an alarm. This output is of no surprise because
our normal web requests do not contain code.
To evaluate the performance of SigFree, we
implemented a proxy-based SigFree prototype using
the C programming language inWin32 environment.
SigFree was compiled with Borland C++ version
5.5.1 at optimization level O2. The prototype
implementation was hosted in a Windows 2003
server with Intel Pentium 4, 3.2GHz CPU and 1G
MB memory.

6. Instruction sequences distiller:
This module distills all possible instruction
sequences from the query parameters of Request-URI
and Request-Body (if the request has one).
Instruction sequences analyzer (ISA). Using all the
instruction sequences distilled from the instruction
sequences distiller as the inputs, this module analyzes
these instruction sequences to determine whether one
of them is (a fragment of) a program.

The proxy-based SigFree prototype accepts
and analyzes all incoming requests from clients. The
client testing traffics were generated by Jef
Poskanzer’s http load program 3 from a Linux
desktop PC with Intel Pentium 4 2.5GHz CPU
connected to theWindows server via a 100 Mbps
LAN switch. We modified the original http load
program so that clients can send code-injected data
requests.

Figure 3 Data structure for the instruction sequences distilled

3. TESTING THE SYSTEM
Clearly, it is critical to set the threshold values
appropriately so as to minimize both detection false
positive rate and false negative rate. To find out the
appropriate thresholds, we tested both schemes of
SigFree against 50 unencrypted attack requests
generated
byMetasploit
framework,
worm
Slammer, CodeRed (CodeRed.a) and a CodeRed
variation
(CodeRed.c),
and
1500
binary
HTTP replies (52 encrypted data, 23 audio, 195
jpeg, 32 png, 1153 gif and 45 flash) intercepted on
the network of College of Information Science and
Technology. Note that we tested on HTTP replies
rather than requests as normal data for parameter
tuning, because HTTP replies include more diverse
binaries (test over real traces of web requests is
reported). Also note that although worm Slammer
attacks Microsoft SQL servers rather than web
servers,
it
also
exploits
buffer
overflow vulnerabilities.
We tested SigFree over real traces. Due to
privacy concerns, we were unable to deploy SigFree
in a public web server to examine realtime web
requests. To make our test as realistic as possible,
we deployed a client-side proxy underneath a web
browser. The proxy recorded a normal user’s http
requests during his/her daily Internet surfing. During
a one-week period, more than ten of our lab
members installed the proxy and helped collect
totally 18,569 HTTP requests. The requests include
manually typed urls, clicks through various web
sites, searchings from search engines such as Google
and Yahoo, secure logins to email servers and bank
servers, and HTTPs requests. In this way, we believe
our data set is diverse enough, not worse than that
we might have got if we install SigFree in a single

Upload files
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Search
Admin

Request URL

User

Get response

Download files

Figure 4 Use case Diagram
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Figure 5 Class Diagram

International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology (IJCCT), ISSN: 2231-0371, Vol-6, Iss-3
158

Preventing buffer overflow attacks with Reliable and low cost system

also handle

4. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

encrypted

SSL

messages.
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Most malware detection schemes include twostage analysis. The first stage is disassembling
binary code and the second stage is analyzing the
disassembly
results. There
are
obfuscation
techniques to attack each stage [9, 3] and attackers
may use them to evade detection. Table 1 shows that
SigFree is robust to most of these obfuscation
techniques.
Junk byte insertion is one of the simplest
obfuscation against disassembly. Here junk bytes are
inserted at locations that are not reachable at runtime. This insertion however can mislead a linear
sweep algorithm, but can not mislead a recursive
traversal algorithm [3], which our algorithm bases
on.
Opaque predicates are used to transform
unconditional jumps into conditional branches.
Opaque predicates are predicates that are always
evaluated to either true or false regardless of the
inputs. This allows an obfuscator to insert junk bytes
either at the jump target or in the place of the fallthrough instruction.
We note that opaque predicates may make
SigFree mistakenly interpret junk byte as executable
codes. However, this mistake will not cause SigFree
to miss any real malicious instructions. Therefore,
SigFree is also immune to obfuscation based on
opaque predicates.
SigFree also has several limitations. First,
SigFree cannot fully handle the branch-function
based obfuscation, as indicated in Table 1. Branch
function is a function f(x) that, whenever called
from x, causes control to be transferred to the
corresponding
location
f(x).
By replacing
unconditional branches in a program with calls to
the branch function, attackers can obscure the flow
of control in the program. We note that there are no
general solutions for handling branch function at the
present state of the art.
Second, the executable shell codes could be
written in alphanumeric form [5]. Such shell codes
will be treated as printable ASCII data and thus
bypass our analyzer.
By turning off the ASCII filter, Scheme 2 can
successfully detect
alphanumeric
shellcodes;
however, it will increase unnecessary computational
overhead. It therefore requires a slight tradeoff
between tight security and system performance.
We proposed SigFree, a real-time, signature
free, out of- the-box blocker that can filter codeinjection buffer overflow attack messages, one of the
most serious cyber security threats, to various
Internet services. SigFree does not require any
signatures, thus it can block new, unknown attacks.
SigFree is immunized from most attack-side code
obfuscation methods, good for economical Internet
wide deployment with little maintenance cost and
negligible throughput degradation, and can
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